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ABSTRACT:  In the aftermath of the 
global financial turmoil the negative 
market sentiment and the challenging 
macroeconomic environment in Greece 
have severely affected the banking 
sector, which faces funding and liquidity 
challenges, deteriorating asset quality, and 
weakening profitability. This paper aims to 
investigate how banks’ liquidity interacted 
with solvency and the business cycle during 
the period 2004-2010. To this end a panel 
of 17 Greek banks is utilized which, in 
conjunction with cointegrating techniques 
and one-way static and dynamic panel 
models, explores the presence and the 
strength of the relationship between banks’ 
liquidity and the business cycle, while 
allowing for the role of banks’ solvency. 
Addressing the liquidity risk of the Greek 
banking sector and the liquidity-solvency 
nexus remains largely an uncharted area. 
The results generated provide clear-cut 
evidence on the linkages between banks’ 
market liquidity and the business cycle, as 
reflected in the real GDP and the effective 
exchange rate. Yet the results display a 
transmission channel that runs from banks’ 
solvency to liquidity and from country risk 
to bank risk. 
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1. InTRODuCTIOn
Broadly speaking, the Greek banking sector entered the global financial crisis 
in a relatively sound financial state. In light of the rapid and sharp worsening of 
the fiscal situation in Greece, financial markets and rating agencies turned their 
attention to the sustainability of Greece’s fiscal and external imbalances. What 
followed was an utter disaster, as the entire banking edifice was on the brink of 
collapse, rendering banks almost insolvent. Rapidly, the eruption of the Greek 
debt crisis spilled over into banks’ fundamentals, and banks sought emergency 
capital and liquidity assistance, initially from the State and later from Eurozone 
rescue funds.
Undoubtedly, comprehending fully the mechanism through which economic 
crises affect the process of financial intermediation through the banking sector 
remains a key challenge, since empirical studies are rather scarce (Gorton, 2012). 
In the Greek context the research area remains uncharted, with the scarcity 
of studies owing to the inherent elusiveness of bank data, the problems of 
providing operational definitions of crises events, and the fact that the sovereign 
debt crisis has not yet been fully addressed (Candelon and Palm, 2010). Most 
empirical studies in the Greek context use models of banks’ profitability or asset 
quality that include mostly financial ratios as explanatory variables and do not 
explicitly account for systematic problems arising from an adverse evolution of 
the macroeconomic environment.
This study, by utilizing a panel of 17 Greek banks that cover about 90% of the 
sector’s assets, attempts to shed some light on the relationship of liquidity and the 
business cycle in the period 2004-2010. Furthermore, the study investigates how 
liquidity and solvency, the twins of banking, interact with each other in the period 
2004-2010. In particular, Section 2 very succinctly reviews the existing literature 
in the specific area whilst Section 3 touches on the empirical methodology used, 
as well as presenting the evidence generated from the estimation process. Finally, 
Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
2.   LIquIDITY-CApITAL AnD ThE BuSInESS CYCLE:  
A REVIEW OF EmpIRICAL STuDIES
This section provides a critical account of the literature on the relation between 
banks’ liquidity and the business cycle, emphasizing the role of capital in the 
equation. The aim is to facilitate the choice of methodology and provide grounding LIqUIDITy AND ThE BUSINESS CyCLE IN ThE GREEK BANKING SECTOR
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for the research framework. hence, meaningful variables and latent relationships 
worth exploring subsequently emerge from this section. 
Broadly, the empirical literature provides conflicting assumptions about 
the relationship between capital and liquidity creation, both in terms of its 
magnitude and of the nature of its causality. Diamond and Rajan (2001) assert 
that tightening capital requirements hampers liquidity creation1. Using Granger 
causality tests in a dynamic panel framework, horvath et al. (2012) find that 
capital negatively Granger-causes liquidity creation in the Czech banking sector, 
where the majority of banks are small. On the other hand Berger and Bouwman 
(2009), in a pioneering article, frame the causal link that moves from banks’ 
capital to liquidity creation. The authors’ “risk absorption hypothesis” suggests 
that increased capital enhances the ability of banks to create liquidity. This 
hypothesis stems from the theoretical literature concerning the role of banks as 
risk transformers (Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993; Allen and Gale, 2004). Using 
an unbalanced panel of SEE banks from 2001 to 2009, Athanasoglou (2011) 
explores the role of liquidity on capital and posits a positive, significant, and 
robust effect.
Granting loans is an indispensable feature of a healthy financial sector, and a 
solid deposit base is a key to sustainable and stable credit growth (Westerlund, 
2003; Guo and Stepanyan, 2011). Following this train of thought, Westerlund’s 
(2003) results suggest that loan growth falls significantly following a monetary 
contraction, while the fall is pronounced among illiquid and under-capitalised 
banks. Consistent with theory, well-capitalised and liquid banks are expected to 
supply more credit (Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Kishan and Opiela, 2000). 
Many banking system crises, especially in developing countries, display a 
recurrent pattern of distress, with insolvency and illiquidity usually traceable 
to pervasive government involvement, while other countries have experienced 
macroeconomic collapses before the crisis (honohan, 1997). In general, empirical 
studies concur that good economic conditions positively affect the quality of 
banks’ fundamentals, whereas disturbances anywhere in the business cycle 
and the macro-economy are likely to have repercussions on the banking system 
(Arpa et al., 2001; quagliariello, 2004). Models of banks’ pro-cyclical behaviour 
aim to answer whether the business cycle affects banks’ financials and if banks’ 
behaviour reinforces fluctuations in the business cycle. Furthermore, models that 
1  The authors’ results also suggest that if a liquidity shock hits, the banks with higher leverage 
could be more likely to survive because they can encounter the shock through asset sales.112
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include macroeconomic variables as regressors perform better than those that 
employ solely bank-specific variables (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; hardy and Pazarbasioglu, 1999; quagliariello, 
2008).
Although the empirical evidence on the liquidity-capital nexus appears mixed, 
the theory of liquidity points to a correlation between banks’ liquidity, capital, 
and the business cycle that is worth testing empirically. While most economists 
may consider that a ‘trivially true’ relationship exists between macroeconomic 
conditions and banks’ balance sheets (Jacobson et al., 2005), in practice it is 
challenging to quantify these linkages, given the idiosyncratic features of the 
Greek banks and the timeline of the research. The latter manifests itself as an 
innovative feature of our paper, yet is an endeavour in uncharted territory, given 
the scarcity of empirical studies on the liquidity-capital nexus, especially in the 
Greek context. 
3. EmpIRICAL InVESTIGATIOn
Using two metrics of liquidity, we investigate the liquidity-capital nexus and the 
impact of business cycle and crisis-related factors on Greek banks’ liquidity. hence, 
the modelling exercise employs the liquid asset ratio (LAR) that serves as a proxy 
for market liquidity and the loan-to-deposit ratio (LD) as a measure of funding 
liquidity2. Both ratios are simple yet transparent measures of banks’ liquidity 
positions. A similar notion applies to the banks’ solvency that is approximated by 
the equity to assets ratio, known as capital ratio. Estrella et al. (2000) point out 
that simple capital ratios which are virtually costless to implement are as effective 
in predicting banking failures as more complex ratios. 
Table 1 in Appendix III reports the correlation coefficients between the liquidity 
measures and a set of explanatory variables over the period 2004-2010. Between 
them the liquidity measures exhibit a strong negative association, revealed by the 
coefficient of -0.4, suggesting that market and funding liquidity move in opposite 
directions. The market liquidity proxy is positively related to capital and credit 
growth, providing some preliminary evidence in line with expectations. 
2  Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007) distinguish between two types of liquidity: market 
liquidity and funding liquidity. The former refers to the asset side and the latter to the liability 
side of the banks’ balance sheets.LIqUIDITy AND ThE BUSINESS CyCLE IN ThE GREEK BANKING SECTOR
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The methodology
For the empirical investigation both static and dynamic panel data analysis are 
utilized and effectively applied to a dataset consisting of 17 Greek banks spanning 
the period 2004 to 2010. 
The term ‘panel data’ refers to the pooling of observations of different entities, 
banks in this case, on the same individual variables over several time periods 
(Baltagi, 2003). Thus, panel data combine features of both time series and cross-
sectional data. A main advantage of panel data compared to other types of data 
is that it allows testing and relaxing of the assumptions that are implicit in cross-
sectional analysis (Maddala, 2001). A number of econometricians assert that 
panel data analysis can be beneficial in a number of ways (Baltagi, 2003; Gujarati, 
2004; hsiao, 2005). 
The static model
The use of pooled time series and cross sections allows us to take into account 
the unobserved and time invariant heterogeneity across banks. The main models 
used in static one-way panel data analysis are:
(a) The pooled model
(b) The fixed effects model 
(c)  The random effects model 
For the estimation of the models we use a dataset which consists of N cross-
sectional units, denoted i = 1,…,N observed at T time periods, denoted t = 1,…,T. 
Therefore the total number of observations is T × N. Then, y is a (TN × 1) vector 
of endogenous variables, X is a (TN × k) matrix of exogenous variables, which 
does not include a column of units for the constant term. In the context of the 
research, N = 17 and T = 7. In econometric terms, the setup is described in the 
following equation:
yit = ai + bixit + eit , (1)
where yit is the dependent variable, ai is the intercept term, bi is a k×1 vector of 
parameters to be estimated on the explanatory variables, and xit is a 1×k vector 
of observations on the explanatory variables, t = 1, . . . , T, i = 1, . . . , N. The 
specification in equation (1) suggests a linear panel data model. The associated 
assumptions to the model are:114
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-  Error terms are normally distributed and have zero mean and standard 
deviation si
2, eit ~ i.i.d. (0 ,si
2 )
-  Similar variances among banks, si
2 = se
2   "i 
-  Zero covariances among banks, Cov(eit ,ejs) = 0 for i ≠ j
We then proceed with the choice of the best alternative static specification that 
links to the pros and cons of each specification. The argument in favour of the 
random effects model are that the fixed effects model or LSDV often results in a 
loss of a large number of degrees of freedom and also eliminates a large portion 
of the total variation in the panel. Another argument is that ai combine a total 
of several factors specific to the cross-sectional units and as such they represent 
‘specific ignorance’ (Maddala, 2001). hence, ai can be treated as random variables 
by much the same argument that eit representing ‘general ignorance’ can be treated 
as random variables. On the other hand, there are two arguments in favour of 
the use of the fixed effects model. The first, common in the analysis of variance 
literature, is that if the analysis wants to make inferences about only this set of 
cross-sectional units then we should treat ai as fixed. On the other hand, if we 
want to make inferences about the population from which these cross-sectional 
data come, then ai should be treated as random. Mundlak (1978) argues that the 
dichotomy between the fixed effects and random effects model disappears if we 
make the assumption that ai depend on the mean values of xit, an assumption 
regarded as reasonable in many problems. 
The dynamic model
The dynamic panel data specifications are used in this study’s models in an attempt 
to capture the time path of the dependent variable in relation to its past values. 
Many related studies provide evidence that bank-specific or economic variables 
are dynamic in nature (Athanasoglou et al., 2006; Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano, 
2006; Louzis et al., 2012). For instance, Athanasoglou et al. (2006) criticize other 
studies that falsely assume a static relationship between bank-specific variables 
when in fact it is a dynamic one. A body of literature indicates that in typical 
micro-panels with large N and small T, the fixed effect (FE) estimator is biased 
and inconsistent when the model is dynamic. Similarly, the random effects GLS 
estimator is also biased in a dynamic panel data model (Baltagi, 2003). yet many 
economic relationships are dynamic in nature and should be modelled as such 
(Asteriou and hall, 2007).
In view of these arguments, our approach involves the estimation of dynamic 
panel data models using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) framework LIqUIDITy AND ThE BUSINESS CyCLE IN ThE GREEK BANKING SECTOR
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originated by holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). Pesaran et al. (1999) argue that even if the 
dynamic specification is unlikely to be the same in all cross sections, it is still 
possible to pool the estimates treating the model as a system since, as Baltagi 
and Griffin (1997) argue, the efficiency gain from pooling the data outweighs the 
losses from the bias introduced by heterogeneity. Empirical literature suggests 
that Arellano and Bond’s (1991) framework suits cases with small T and bigger N 
(but N>T), especially when samples are small, as with the undertaken research, 
and the model is of dynamic form as emphasized by a number of authors (Pain, 
2003; quagliariello, 2004; Louzis et al., 2012). Also, the need to validate the static 
models’ results - triangulation of methods – justifies the use of Arellano and 
Bond’s (1991) framework.
The Results
We kick off the empirical process by investigating the existence of a cointegrating 
relationship between banks’ liquidity and solvency. Subsequently, we estimate 
static and dynamic models to capture the factors that affect Greek banks’ liquidity 
in the short-run. The results of unit root tests, shown in Table 2 of Appendix III, 
point out that the variables used to proxy banks’ liquidity (LAR) and solvency (EA) 
are integrated of order 1, i.e., I(1). Subsequently, the Pedroni panel cointegration3 
results, reported in Table 3 of Appendix III, suggest that the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration can be rejected in three out of seven cases at all significance levels4. 
hence, the outcome seems to advocate a positive link between liquidity and 
capital in concert with expectations arising from theoretical standpoints. Then, 
we model the banks’ liquidity as a function of a number of exogenous variables 
and banks’ solvency, using the general to specific approach. The estimated static 
and dynamic models are couched in the following manner: 
  +  – –
LARit = a0 + a1EAit + a2DGDPt + a3REEDt + εit (2)
  + +  –  –
ΔLARit = b0ΔLARit-1 + b1ΔEAit + b2ΔDGDPt + b3ΔREEDt + Δεit (3)
i= 1,…,17; t= 2004,..., 2010
3  The Pedroni (1999) panel cointegration test is based on seven statistics, four of which are called 
panel statistics and pool the autoregressive coefficient in the residual-based test, while the 
remaining four, the group statistics, take the average, thus allowing for more heterogeneity. 
4  In another two cases, the no cointegration hypothesis is rejected at a 5% significance level. 116
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where LARit denotes the ratio of liquid assets to total assets for bank i at time 
t, and EAit is the capital to assets ratio for bank i at time t. The business cycle is 
reflected in DGDPt, the growth rate of GDP, REEDt , is the growth rate of the 
real effective exchange rate in terms of unit labour costs that serves as a proxy for 
the economy’s competitiveness. The operator Δ in the dynamic equation denotes 
the data transformation – first differences or orthogonal deviations – used to 
reduce the banks’ individual effects. The panel regression results are summarized 
in Table 1.
Among the alternative static specifications the fixed effects model has an 
advantage, whilst on the basis of the Sargan test the dynamic model that uses 
orthogonal deviations is preferred. The static and dynamic frameworks fit 
the data reasonably well, presenting fairly stable coefficients bounding the 
relationship under investigation. In the static modelling framework the tests for 
redundant fixed effects and the likelihood ratio reject the null hypothesis that 
the cross-sectional effects are unnecessary. The fixed effects model maintains 
that about 75% of the variation in LAR over the period 2004-2010 is explained 
by the model’s variables. Banks’ solvency and GDP have a positive significant 
and contemporaneous effect on liquidity. On the other hand REED has a clear 
negative association with liquidity. 
The dynamic specifications present an acceptable convergence with the outcome 
of the fixed effects model. Both dynamic models seem to fit the panel data 
adequately, presenting stable coefficients. The Wald test suggests an adequate 
goodness of fit5 and the Sargan test provides no evidence of over-identifying 
restrictions in both dynamic specifications. All significant variables in the 
static model remain significant in the dynamic specification. Furthermore, the 
variables’ coefficients turn out to be close in magnitude and bear the same signs 
in both static and dynamic models6. A significant lagged liquidity lends evidence 
in favour of the dynamic specification, suggesting a moderate persistence of 
market liquidity.
5  The related X2 or F-statistic of the Wald test is significant, suggesting that the null hypothesis 
that all coefficients are jointly not significant is rejected at all conventional significance levels. 
6  The variables’ coefficients remain almost the same in both dynamic specifications. Still, the 
standard errors in the dynamic specifications are smaller than those in static model, an issue 
which gives credit to the dynamic framework. LIqUIDITy AND ThE BUSINESS CyCLE IN ThE GREEK BANKING SECTOR
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A major hypothesis under investigation remains the interaction between banks’ 
liquidity and solvency. In the light of the Greek crisis, the results evidence a clear-cut 
nexus between liquidity and capital, in agreement with theory and other empirical 
studies (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). A high leverage ratio7, or alternatively a 
weak capital position, is critical in the propagation of banks’ liquidity shocks. The 
results’ importance relates to the theory that maintains that well capitalised and 
liquid banks are able to provide credit in the economy (Kashyap and Stein, 1995; 
Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Westerlund, 2003). Contrary to horvath et al.’s (2012) 
study on Czech banks, but broadly in line with the framework of new capital rules 
known as Basel III8 and Berger and Bouwman’s (2009), the modelling outcome 
suggests that solvency increases liquidity creation. On the other hand the results 
support a negative association of REED, a leading crisis indicator, with market 
liquidity. In the research’s timeline, Greece’s currency appears to be persistently 
overvalued, pointing to a loss in competiveness and higher domestic inflation 
compared to eurozone countries (Meghir et al., 2010; Polychroniou, 2011). And 
this divergence in competitiveness or real exchange rate misalignment can be 
traced to excessive debt accumulation in a bi-directional relationship (Babecky et 
al., 2010). Thus, the modelling results support the “sovereign crisis hypothesis”, 
maintaining also the premise of the real exchange rate as a crisis indicator 
(Kaminsky et al., 1998; hardy and Pazarbasioglu, 1999; Frankel and Saravelos, 
2010). Overall, the role of capital and cyclical movements in macroeconomic 
variables are valuable indicators in explaining the Greek banks’ market liquidity 
in the crisis period. 
Improving banks’ liquidity, and therefore their capacity to fund themselves 
without relying on rescue funds, will flow from putting straight other challenges, 
namely solvency and asset quality. Realistically, returning to a normal liquidity 
position is only likely to occur after the Greek crisis has been resolved. 
7  The leverage ratio is defined as the ratio of assets to equity, which is the inverse of the capital 
ratio used in the research defined as equity to assets. The leverage ratio has been attracting 
increasing attention worldwide because it has been a source of weakness for banks even in 
strong economies. Thus, it is another indicator of the resilience of Greek banks. 
8  Based on the premise that the low solvency levels of banks lies at the centre of financial 
crises, Basel III emphasizes the importance of stronger capital requirements and of liquidity 
creation as well. LIqUIDITy AND ThE BUSINESS CyCLE IN ThE GREEK BANKING SECTOR
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4. COnCLuDInG REmARKS
Using correlation analysis, cointegrating techniques, and one-way static and 
dynamic panel models we explored the presence as well as the strength of the 
relationship between banks’ liquidity with the business cycle, while allowing for 
the role of solvency.
The modelling framework used identified several significant relationships 
between the variables of interest. In all modelling cases, the static and dynamic 
framework presented an adequate fit of the data confining the relationship 
under investigation, as the results produced by the two methods were very 
close. Broadly, business cycle variables were found to be semantic in explaining 
the Greek banks’ liquidity over the period 2004-2010. In line with theory, the 
business cycle reflected in the growth in real GDP and the real effective exchange 
rate in labour costs - also a leading crisis indicator - exerts a significant effect 
on Greek banks’ market liquidity. Also, the results pinpoint a clear-cut nexus 
between market liquidity and solvency. Economic growth is liquidity-friendly, 
but macroeconomic imbalances reflected in the real exchange rate weaken 
banks’ liquid positions. The modelling outcome contributes to the research 
agenda of Greek banks and provides the basis for policy recommendations. 
Solid capital positions are important during prosperous but also during troubled 
economic periods. Alternatively, solvency shocks can induce liquidity problems 
and constrain significantly the bank’s intermediation role. Addressing banks’ 
liquidity is a pressing issue that can be solved through stronger capital bases and 
restoring competitiveness in the economy.
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AppEnDIx I: ThE DATASET
Table 1.  The sample of Greek banks
Bank  Total 
Assets
Gross 
Loans Deposits
1 National Bank of Greece (NBG)  120.745 75.105 68.039
2 Eurobank Ergasias (EFG) 87.188 58.597 44.435
3 Alpha Bank (ALP) 66.798 51.525 38.293
4 Piraeus Bank (PIR) 57.680 40.027 29.254
5 ATE Bank (ATE) 31.221 22.912 19.683
6 Marfin Egnatia Bank (MEG) 22.131 13.794 9.861
7 Emporiki Bank (EMP) 26.777 24.105 12.246
8 TT hellenic Postbank (TT) 16.566 8.216 12.125
9 Millennium Bank (MIL) 6.858 5.123 3.122
10 Proton Bank (PRN) 4.255 2.058 1.934
11 Attica Bank (ATT) 4.770 3.892 3.317
12 Probank (PRO) 3.938 2.876 3.031
13 Geniki Bank (GEN) 4.276 4.332 2.361
14 T Bank (TB) 2.733 1.939 1.701
15 FBB First Business Bank (FBB)  1.850 1.562 1.349
16 Panellinia Bank (PAN) 964 671 501
17 Aegean Baltic Bank (ABB) 385 217 221
Total of sample  459.135 316.949 251.472
Total Assets of Greek Banking System 514.130 377.175 281.197
Percentage of system covered by sample  89.3% 84.0% 89.4%
Sources:    BankScope, Banks’ IFRS audited annual reports. 
Amounts in millions of euro. 
Table 2.  The dataset of the bank-specific variables
Variable Definition Measures or Proxies
EA Equity to assets Capital – Solvency
GLG Gross loans (% change pa) Growth in loans
LAR Liquid assets to total assets Liquidity
LD  Loans to deposits Liquidity 
Sources:    Bankscope, Banks’ IFRS audited annual reports. 
All ratios expressed in percentage points124
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Table 3.  The set of macroeconomic variables
Variable Definition
DGDP Gross domestic product, real (% change pa)
PUDP Public debt (% of GDP)
REED Real Effective Exchange Rate (unit labour costs, % change pa)
Sources:  IMF Statistics, OECD, EIU.
AppEnDIx II: DESCRIpTIVE STATISTICS AnD DATA pLOTS
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics of the bank-specific variables
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations
EA 8.66 7.14 73.30 -1.86 7.58 119
GLG 20.88 16.63 159.10 -12.77 22.45 114
LAR 19.53 16.98 65.86 2.51 10.84 119
LD 1.10 1.10 1.97 0.22 0.30 119
Source:  Authors calculations.
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics of the macroeconomic variables
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std.Dev. Observations
DGDP 1.18 2.28 5.54 -3.52 3.59 7
PUDP 114.60 107.42 144.97 98.86 16.70 7
REED -0.14 -0.12 3.07 -4.08 2.44 7
Source:  Authors calculations.
AppEnDIx III: LIquIDITY OF GREEK BAnKS
Table 1.  Banks’ liquidity metrics: Correlation Coefficients 
LAR LD
DGDP 0.372 -0.317
PUDP -0.405 0.332
REED -0.028 -0.069
EA 0.655 -0.078
GLG 0.391 -0.265
LAR 1.000 -0.486LIqUIDITy AND ThE BUSINESS CyCLE IN ThE GREEK BANKING SECTOR
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Table 2.  Panel unit root tests for liquidity (LAR) and solvency (EA)
Levin, Lin and Chu test ADF test PP test
LAR -7.122 (0.00) 85.304 (0.00) 107.904(0.00)
EA -13.398 (0.00) 61.387 (0.00) 92.048 (0.00)
Note:  The p-values are shown in brackets next to the corresponding statistic of each test
Table 3.  Pedroni panel cointegration test for liquidity (LAR) and solvency (EA) 
Statistic p-value
Panel v-Statistic  0.461  0.322
Panel rho-Statistic -2.240  0.012
Panel PP-Statistic -6.055  0.000
Panel ADF-Statistic -1.973  0.024
Group rho-Statistic  1.798  0.963
Group PP-Statistic -5.994  0.000
Group ADF-Statistic -12.345  0.000
Note: The Pedroni test is an Engle-Granger type test where the null hypothesis suggests no 
cointegration and the decision is based on seven statistics – panel and group.
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